Journal of Public Management & Social Policy
Volume 25

Number 3

Article 6

January 2019

Interdistrict and Charter School Mobility in Arizona:
Understanding the Dynamics of Public School Choice
Jeanne M. Powers
Arizona State University, jeanne.powers@asu.edu

Amelia M. Topper
Independent Scholar, atopper@gmail.com

Amanda U. Potterton
Arizona State University, amanda.cazin@asu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp
Part of the Educational Assessment, Evaluation, and Research Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy
and Public Administration Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons

Recommended Citation
Powers, Jeanne M.; Topper, Amelia M.; and Potterton, Amanda U. (2019) "Interdistrict and Charter School
Mobility in Arizona: Understanding the Dynamics of Public School Choice," Journal of Public Management
& Social Policy: Vol. 25 : No. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol25/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Public Management & Social Policy by an authorized
editor of Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University. For more information, please contact haiying.li@tsu.edu.

Interdistrict and Charter School Mobility in Arizona: Understanding the Dynamics
of Public School Choice
Cover Page Footnote
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2015 American Educational Research Association
Annual Meeting in Chicago, IL and the 2015 American Educational Finance Policy Annual Conference in
Washington, DC. We would like to thank Gene V Glass and Margarita Pivovarova, and the the reviewers for
their helpful feedback on this paper.

This article is available in Journal of Public Management & Social Policy: https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/
vol25/iss3/6

Powers et al.: The Dynamics of Public School Choice in Arizona

Interdistrict Mobility and Charter Schools in Arizona: Understanding the
Dynamics of Public School Choice
Introduction
Many policymakers view market-oriented school choice policies such as charter
schools and open enrollment as ways to stimulate competition among schools and
provide families with improved schooling options. In this paper, we examine the
patterns of interdistrict student movement within the public school sector in Arizona, or
student movement between traditional public school districts (hereafter referred to as
“school districts”) and between school districts and charter schools. Arizona has
supported public school choice through interdistrict enrollment policies and charter
school reform since the early 1990s. Our analysis addresses lesser-known and
understood outcomes of public school choice policies that have particular relevance for
other state and local settings where multiple public school choice programs are operating
simultaneously.
This analysis extends an exploratory study that focused on student movement
patterns within metropolitan Phoenix, the largest public school “market” in Arizona to
assess if the patterns we documented are evident statewide and within other areas of the
state (Authors, 2012). Our research questions are:
a) What are the patterns of student mobility between and within public school
sectors in Arizona?
b) What are the relationships between district and charter school mobility rates
and other district or school characteristics?
c) Are there variations in the patterns of student movement within and across
local markets?
We expected to find differences in the patterns of movement between districts and
charter schools and that these differences are associated with district or school
characteristics. We also expected to find differences within and across educational
settings that reflect regional differences in the configuration of districts and charter
schools. Our findings indicate that most students in Arizona move between districts
rather than from districts to charter schools. We also document a two-way pattern of
movement between charters and school districts.
A substantial body of research explores the causes and consequences of student
movement between public school districts and charter schools (e.g., Garcia, 2008;
Renzulli & Evans, 2005; Weiher & Tedlin, 2002). Likewise, numerous studies have
assessed the characteristics of students who participate in interdistrict choice programs
(e.g., Fossey, 1994; Holme & Richards, 2009; Witte & Thorn, 1996) and the influences
on school districts’ participation in, and responses to, interdistrict choice (e.g., Fowler,
1996; Ghosh, 2010). The present study is unique because we document patterns of
student movement within the public school sector in local education markets by
analyzing interdistrict and charter school movement simultaneously in a state with longstanding school choice policies. These patterns of student movement are potentially
relevant for policymakers in other state and local contexts because can they help us
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assess the extent to which public school choice policies have fostered the education
markets that policymakers envisioned. Given the continual growth in the charter school
sector (Snyder, de Brey, & Dillow, 2016), our findings may also provide insights about
patterns of student movement in other settings where multiple public school choice
policies are operating simultaneously. These findings also have implications for the
school leaders in these settings who have to grapple with the possible fiscal
consequences of declining enrollments and the challenges of educating students who
move frequently between districts and sectors (Moody’s Investor Service, 2013). If the
Trump administration’s efforts to provide school vouchers for tuition at private schools
are successful (Klein & Ujifusa, 2017), our findings may also help predict the possible
effects of introducing voucher programs alongside existing public school choice
programs on student enrollments.
School Choice in Arizona
Charter schools operate in 42 states and the District of Columbia (DC), and
enrolled 2.5 million students in 2013-14 (U.S. Department of Education, 2016). They
serve a small but growing share of public school students. Between 1999-2000 and
2013-2014, charter school enrollment increased from 0.7 percent of public school
students to 5.1 percent (U.S. Department of Education, 2014, 2016). Forty-six states and
DC have some type of open enrollment policies outlined in their state education codes
(Wixom, 2017). Mandatory interdistrict open enrollment policies require districts to
take part in them, whereas voluntary policies allow districts to choose if they will
participate (Wixom, 2017). While many states with mandatory open enrollment policies
target specific geographic locations, schools, or groups of students (e.g., students
attending low performing schools or low income students), Arizona is one of 11 states
that does not limit families’ participation in interdistrict open enrollment.1 As a result, all
Arizona school districts must allow students to enroll in their schools, space permitting,
regardless of their districts of residence.
Although most public school students do not utilize school choice programs or
policies (Garcia, 2010; Grady & Bielick, 2010; Snyder et al., 2016), expanding school
choice has been a long-standing goal of Arizona policymakers. Arizona’s provisions for
open enrollment and charter schools were approved by the state legislature in 1994 in a
single bill, HB 2002 during a special legislative session (Author, 2009). 2 The open
enrollment and charter school provisions in HB 2002 put Arizona at the forefront of the
movement to expand public school choice. Arizona was the seventh state to pass
legislation mandating open enrollment policies for all public school districts (State of
1

The other 10 states are: Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, South Dakota,
Texas, and Utah. Alaska and Arkansas require interdistrict open enrollment for students attending schools
in facilities distress, while Vermont limits interdistrict open enrollment to high school students (Wixom,
2017).
2
HB 2002 was a compromise from earlier bills considered by the Arizona legislature during the two
regular legislative sessions that preceded it (Luther, 1995). The final version of HB 2002 did not include a
school voucher program in earlier versions of the bill.
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Missouri, 2009).3 Before HB 2002 took effect, Arizona school districts established their
own policies regarding the enrollment of non-resident students, and a considerable
number of students took advantage of these policies.
According to an early analysis conducted by the Arizona Department of
Education (Gallagher, 1992), more than 40,000 students opted to enroll in schools
outside their assigned school districts in 1992 (Gallagher, 1992). Between the 2004-05
and 2007-08 academic years, more than one-quarter of K-12 students in Arizona
transferred schools, with just under 15% of students making an interdistrict transfer and
approximately 6% of students transferring to a school within their districts of residence
(Fong, Bae, & Huang, 2010). Likewise, Arizona was the fourth state to pass charter
school legislation. In 2013-14, charter schools comprised 27% of all Arizona K-12
schools and enrolled 18% of the school-age population (U.S. Department of Education,
2015). While these figures suggest that Arizona’s public school choice policies have
created a unique education market, similarly high mobility rates have been documented
elsewhere (e.g., Dauter & Fuller, 2016; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004).
Conceptual Framework
Market-oriented school choice policies such as interdistrict choice and charter
schools are a means of ensuring that students are not required to attend an assigned
public school based on where they live. The key assumption underlying market-oriented
choice is that given the opportunity, many families will strategically seek out and move
to better schools for their children, a process we refer to as active choice (Authors, 2012).
Ideally, schools will compete for such students by finding market niches through some
form of differentiation (Chubb & Moe, 1990). School choice advocates contend that
competition will force districts and schools to function as education markets and thereby
make them more efficient, effective, and responsive to the needs of parents and students
(Friedman, 1962). As a result, schools will improve over time as they vie for students or
close if they lose market share (e.g., Forster, 2013; Hoxby, 2003).
In essence, market-oriented school choice policies are aimed at facilitating a
form of Tiebout choice, where consumers (parents and students) choose residential
locations that provide the services that best meet their needs and preferences (Tiebout,
1956; Urquiola, 2005). These can include districts or schools that offer specific
curricular foci (e.g., the performing arts, science and mathematics), child-rearing
philosophies, instructional approaches, or extracurricular activities. Some researchers
have argued that active choice facilitated by school choice policies can ultimately
benefit students (Hanushek et al., 2004). They claim that when families choose among
schools to find better matches, in the aggregate and over time these school moves will
raise school quality as measured by student achievement. Yet other studies suggest that
most school changes depress student achievement (Grigg, 2012; Ni & Rorrer, 2012). In
addition, critics of market-oriented school reforms argue that charter schools and other
3

Minnesota, Iowa, Arkansas, Nebraska, Washington, and Utah passed open enrollment laws before
Arizona (State of Missouri, 2009).
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forms of school choice such as voucher programs may increase racial and
socioeconomic segregation (e.g., Cobb & Glass, 1999; Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley, &
Wang, 2011; Frankenberg, Kotok, Schafft, & Mann, 2017; Lacireno-Paquet, Holyoke,
Moser, & Henig, 2002; Lubienski, Gulosino, & Weitzel, 2009; Renzulli & Evans, 2005).
Perhaps most importantly, even in states or districts with long-standing school
choice policies, most students attend their assigned public schools (Dauter & Fuller,
2015; Grady & Bielick, 2010), or remain enrolled in the same schools from one year to
the next (Garcia, 2010). Moreover, most forms of student movement cannot be reliably
attributed to active choice. That is, even in states with mandatory interdistrict choice
policies, it is likely that some student mobility between school districts is a result of
active choice while other forms of mobility are reactive (Rumberger, 2003). Changes in
families’ residence or employment often prompt school moves. Some researchers
distinguish between active choice and reactive mobility and argue that the latter is more
disruptive to students’ learning and lowers school achievement (Hanushek et al., 2004;
Xu & Hannaway, 2009).
Literature Review
We analyzed the nonpromotional 4 movement of elementary grade students
enrolled in a district or charter school at the end of the 2007-08 school year who
transferred to another district or charter school within the local education market at the
beginning of 2008-09 for reasons other than “aging out” of elementary grades. Our
measures of student movement are district and charter school-level exit and entry rates.
We used the Office of Management and Budget’s Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs)
as our proxy for local education markets because they delineate geographic areas that are
socially and economically integrated (United States Census Bureau, 2012).5 While we
cannot directly assess families’ motivations for changing schools, we focus on a specific
type of student movement, school changes between school years, because unlike
mobility during the school year, these are more likely to be a result of active choice than
mid-year school changes. Our assumption is that student movement between sectors
(districts to charter schools and vice versa) is more likely to be a form of active choice,
as is some of the movement between districts within CBSAs. Because some of the
patterns we observe are likely shaped in part by reactive mobility (i.e., some of the
student movement between districts), below we provide an overview of research on
charter schools and interdistrict choice, as well as findings from analyses of student
mobility.
Charter Schools

4

Non-promotional movement is student mobility between districts or charter schools that is not due to
regular grade level progression.
5
CBSAs are statistical areas that contain minimum populations of 10,000 and include core urban areas
and adjacent counties.
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Nationally, charter schools tend to serve fewer White students and a higher
percentage of African American students than traditional public schools (U.S.
Department of Education, 2016), although there is considerable variation in charter
school demographics within and across states and regions (Frankenberg et al., 2011).
These demographic differences are attributable in part to locale; charter schools tend to
be concentrated in urban areas, particularly in large cities that have greater percentages
of minority students. Some studies indicate that charter schools increase racial and
ethnic segregation in public schools by increasing the number of racially-isolated
schools (Bifulco & Ladd, 2007; Cobb & Glass, 1999; Frankenberg et al., 2011; Gulosino
& d’Entremont, 2011; Whitehurst, 2017). However, Ritter, Jensen, Kisida, and McGee
(2010) critique the claim that school segregation is attributable to charter schools
because the traditional public schools students would otherwise attend are also
segregated (see Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley, and Orfield’s [2010] response).
Whitehurst (2017) assessed the relationship between a district-level index of
public school choice with a measure of the racial imbalance between high school
enrollments and the school-age population of the schools’ catchment area for 106 of the
largest districts in the U.S. He found a positive correlation between school choice
options and racial imbalance for blacks and whites; districts with a broader array of
policies that enable school choice tend to be more racially imbalanced than districts with
more limited choice policies. Choice policies were not associated with racial imbalances
of Hispanic and Asian students. Studies using student-level data to conduct finergrained analyses of student movement patterns confirm these broader trends. Most
students who move from traditional public schools to charter schools move to charter
schools with higher percentages of racially similar students although there is
considerable variation across groups and locales (Bifulco & Ladd, 2007; Frankenberg et
al., 2017; Garcia, 2008; Whitehurst, 2017).
Finch, Lapsley, and Baker-Boudissa (2009) examined the influences that shape
non-promotional movement out of charter schools in Indiana. While they did not
compare charter schools with traditional public schools, they documented high exit rates
from of a sample of 11 charter schools that were more than a year old in 2003-04. NonWhite students and lower achieving students were more likely to leave charter schools
before they reached the highest grade offered by the schools than their White and higher
achieving peers. In contrast, Ni and Rorrer (2012) documented lower turnover in charter
schools compared to traditional public schools in Utah. However, Utah’s charter
schools tend to serve a predominantly White and more affluent student population than
charter schools in other states, so the lower mobility rate they observed may be related in
part to student demographics.
Overall, these studies did not address the effects of these demographic patterns
and enrollment trends on school districts, although they do provide important insights
into broader state or regional enrollment trends, the factors associated with students’
movement to charter schools, and achievement outcomes. They also tend to focus on a
single form of public school choice. In our earlier study of student movement between
school districts in metropolitan Phoenix (Authors, 2012) we found that urban districts in
the metropolitan core tended to have higher rates of mobility and a greater number of
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students moving between districts while suburban districts had lower rates of mobility
but comparatively higher rates of students moving to and from charter schools. In
general, mobility patterns tended to be reciprocal rather than one-way, which may be
more aptly characterized as a two-way pattern rather than one that suggests high levels
of competition between districts and charter schools.
Interdistrict Choice
Most analyses of interdistrict choice focus on the relationship between the
characteristics of school districts and outcomes ranging from participation in a voluntary
choice program, patterns of student movement, and student demand. District wealth has
been identified as a key factor shaping the likelihood that districts will participate in
voluntary choice programs (Fowler, 1996; Rincke, 2006) and how they respond to the
loss of students to other districts (Armor & Peiser, 1998, Aud, 1999). School districts
may also be more likely to participate in a voluntary interdistrict choice program if
neighboring districts are participating (Fowler, 1996; Rincke, 2006).
One consistent finding across states is that receiving districts tend to have greater
financial resources (e.g., higher per pupil spending, higher family incomes, or property
values) than sending districts (Armor & Peiser, 1998; Fossey, 1994; Holme & Richard,
2009; Welsch, Statz, & Skidmore, 2010). Some studies suggest that families are more
likely to leave districts with greater percentages of minority and poor students than their
destination districts (Armor & Peiser, 1998; Welsch et al., 2010). However, Holme and
Richard (2009) found evidence of different patterns of mobility among White and
minority students in metropolitan Denver. While White students were leaving relatively
less White and affluent districts for Whiter and lower poverty districts, minority students
were leaving Whiter and more affluent districts to attend districts with higher
percentages of poor and minority students. The net effect of these patterns was to
increase the racial and class segregation of school districts.
These patterns may be partially attributable to differences in student achievement.
Reback (2008) found that district achievement was a stronger predictor of transfer
requests in Minnesota than measures of socio-economic status and spending. Moreover,
districts’ transfer requests tended to increase as test scores in neighboring districts
decreased. In a study of the influences on transactional open enrollment flows in
Colorado and Minnesota, Carlson, Lavery, and Witte (2011) found that higher achieving
districts and lower poverty districts experienced greater student loss than lower
achieving districts; transferring students moved to districts with comparatively higher
achievement and spending than the districts they moved from. The racial composition
of districts was not associated with patterns of student movement once other variables
were accounted for. The authors suggested that most families participating in
interdistrict choice were primarily concerned with indicators of school quality such as
test scores, but other factors (e.g., the demographic composition of school settings) also
played an important role in families’ choices. However, transportation or the lack
thereof may also have shaped these findings. In settings where families have to provide
their own transportation to take advantage of school choice programs and policies, poor
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families are less likely to participate than more affluent families because poor families
have less access to transportation.
Mobility
Research on non-promotional student mobility indicates that there is substantial
student movement between schools (e.g., Fong et al., 2010, U.S. Government
Accountability Office [GAO], 2010). According to Garcia et al. (2010), 15% of Arizona
elementary school students changed schools between the 2007-08 and 2008-09 academic
years. Charter school students were more likely to change schools (23%) than students
enrolled at traditional public schools (13%) (Garcia et al., 2010).
In general, student mobility rates vary by geographic locale and student
demographics (Authors, 2012). Students in urban areas are more mobile than students in
suburban or rural areas (U.S. GAO, 1994; Rumberger, 2003). Lower income, minority,
special education, and English language learner students tend to have higher rates of
mobility than their more advantaged peers (Alexander, Entwisle, & Dauber, 1996; Fong
et al., 2010; Grigg, 2012; Kerbow, 1996; Kerbow, Azcoitia, & Buell, 2003; Lleras &
McKillips, 2017; Parke & Kanyongo, 2012; Rumberger, 2003; Schafft, 2006; U.S. GAO,
2010; Wright, 1999).
Some studies have examined the relationship between mobility and school and
student achievement. In an early study, Bruno and Isken (1996) found that in the Los
Angeles Unified School District the year-to-year mobility rate was negatively related to
school achievement. More recently, Parke and Kanyongo (2012) analyzed mobility
patterns in a large northeastern urban school district and found that there was a
considerable achievement gap between mobile students and their more stable peers, and
these gaps were similar across racial/ethnic groups. Scherrer’s (2012) analysis of data
from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (ECLS-K) indicated that students who
changed schools between the third and fifth grades had lower reading achievement after
controlling for race, student socioeconomic status, and school socioeconomic status (see
also Lleras & McKillip, 2017). Scherrer (2012) also analyzed the relationship between
mobility, school socioeconomic status, and school achievement within a single school
district to suggest that student mobility mediates the relationship between school
socioeconomic status and school achievement.
As suggested above, some studies of school choice distinguish between different
types of mobility and suggest active choice via switching schools to attend a charter
school has a positive effect on student achievement (Hanushek et al., 2004) although
other studies have produced conflicting findings. For example, Bifulco and Ladd (2007)
found that students who left traditional public schools in North Carolina to attend charter
schools had lower achievement in both math and reading than their peers who did not
change schools and that these effects were particularly pronounced for African
American students whose parents did not attend college. Likewise, compared to their
peers who did not change schools, students who transferred from traditional public
schools to charter schools or another traditional public school in Utah tended to have
lower achievement, while students who transferred from a charter school to a traditional
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public school had higher achievement (Ni & Rorrer, 2012). Grigg (2012) found that
students in Nashville who changed schools between school years for reasons other than
promotion had lower math and reading achievement than their stable peers which
suggests that school moves due to active choice may lower student performance, at least
in the short term.
Finally, a limited number of mobility studies address the reasons for student
movement. For example, Kerbow et al. (2003) found that students in Chicago moved
schools due to residential changes (58%) or concerns about safety or academic
opportunity (42%). Their findings also suggested that active choice accounted for a
substantial portion of student movement. In contrast, Schafft’s (2006) case study of
student mobility in a poor rural New York school district indicated that 29% of students
entered or exited the district during the 2003-04 academic year, and these moves tended
to be an outcome of family poverty and economic instability rather than active choice.
This study extends the literatures described above by examining patterns of
movement between school districts and between school districts and charter schools
simultaneously, which allows us to make comparisons across sectors and regions. This
approach has allowed us to highlight an interesting and seldom studied pattern of student
movement. Students moved from charter schools and into traditional school districts at
roughly the same rates as students who left traditional school districts for charter schools.
In addition, we also document much higher rates of student movement between school
districts (at least some of which is attributable to active choice) compared to the rates of
students that leave traditional public schools to attend charter schools.
Data and Methods
We analyzed statewide district-level transactional data (Carlson et al., 2011)
obtained from the Arizona Department of Education’s Data Warehouse that tracked
student enrollment for funding purposes. We also mapped mobility patterns in the three
largest CBSAs in the state using ArcGIS to compare and contrast the differences within
and across local markets; our maps allowed us to assess the geospatial relationships
between the two forms of public school choice. Our data is comprised of district and
charter school-level counts of elementary grade students who were eligible for
enrollment in one of the districts’ schools at two time points (i.e., they did not “age out”
of the grades offered by the district). Because in many Arizona communities schools are
organized into separate elementary and high school districts that essentially function as
separate markets with different numbers of school districts within the public sector
(Urquiola, 2005), we focused on districts and charter schools that served elementary
grade students. There are only 27 high school districts in the state that span multiple
elementary school districts and cross municipal boundaries. The large number of small
elementary districts provides greater options for interdistrict mobility for elementary
grade students than for high school students. For example, in central city Phoenix, 11
elementary districts feed into one high school district. In addition, many charter high
schools target at-risk students, a market segment, so they are not competing for the
general school population in the same way that most elementary-serving charter schools
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and districts are. Finally, focusing on elementary districts also facilitated mapping
because the two types of districts cover the same geographic areas in some regions. The
charter schools were largely clustered in city and suburban districts in the two major
metropolitan areas in the state, Phoenix and Tucson, although a number of charter
schools were located in rural school districts.
Mobility Variables
For each school district and charter school we had counts of: a) the students who
remained enrolled in the same district or charter school between the end of the 2007-08
school year and the beginning of 2008-09 (stayers); b) the students who moved to any
other district or charter school within the state (movers), listed by district or charter
school; and, c) the racial demographics of stayers and movers. That is, our analysis
focuses on elementary grade students who, once enrolled in a district or charter school,
moved to another school at the beginning of the following school year. We refer to
these students as eligible for re-enrollment in the sections that follow. Our student
counts did not include students who moved out of the school district or charter school
because of grade-level progression (e.g., non-promotional moves), students who moved
out of state, or new students in 2008-09. We matched this dataset to district-level
variables in the National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data (CCD)
and aggregated the data to calculate the variables used in our analysis:6
a) the percentage of students who were enrolled in the school district or charter
school at the end of the 2007-08 school year who remained enrolled at the
beginning of the 2008-09 school year (stayers);
b) the percentage of students who moved to another school district or charter
school within the state at the beginning of 2008-09 (movers);
c) the percentage of movers who attended a school district with the same
CBSA;
d) the percentage of movers who attended a charter school within the same
CBSA;
e) the percentage of students entering the school district or charter school at the
beginning of 2008-09 from any school district or charter school in the state
(incomers);
f) the percentage of incomers who attended another school district within the
same CBSA in 2007-2008, the previous academic year; and
g) the percentage of incomers who attended another charter school within the
same CBSA in 2007-08.
6

Categories c and d are subcategories of category b. Likewise, categories f and g are subcategories of
category e. We used the CCD to identify district type (school district or charter school) and to match
districts and charter schools to the CBSA. The denominators for categories a through d were the total of
stayers plus movers, or all of the students in enrolled in elementary grades in each district at the end of
2007-08 that were eligible to re-enroll at the beginning of the following academic year (2008-09). The
denominators for categories e through g were the total of stayers plus incomers. These counts are
provided in Table 1 as Students End 2007-08 and Students Beg. 2008-09, respectively.
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We also calculated the percentage difference in reenrollment as the difference between
the number of the district or charter school’s eligible re-enrollment students at the
beginning of 2008-09 minus the re-enrollment sample at the end of 2007-08, divided by
the re-enrollment sample in 2007-08.
Districts and charter schools without complete information on the sending or
receiving districts/schools, or those that were missing information on the CBSA from the
CCD were omitted from the dataset. This strategy excluded a handful of charter schools
that closed. Our goal in this analysis was to assess movement between districts and
charter schools that were open for business over the two-year period of the study, rather
than forced moves due to school closures. While some of the school districts in our
sample are small, we did not exclude them from the analysis because there is a wide
range in school district size in Arizona. In 2008-09, 20% of all school districts in
Arizona served 100 or fewer students while 12% served 10,000 or more students.6
Our final dataset contains almost the full population of elementary grade districts
and approximately half of the charter schools in the state.7 While our data allow us to
assess movements between public school districts and charter schools, it underestimates
the student movement within the traditional public school sector because we cannot
track intradistrict movement. Our data also do not allow us to address within-year
mobility, which is a different although related phenomenon. Our goal in this analysis is
to provide insights into why students and families, once enrolled in a particular district
or charter school, leave that setting and enroll elsewhere. Likewise, while our data allow
us to examine interdistrict and charter school mobility at one point in time, the patterns
we document here may change as the number of charter schools expands and charter
school enrollment increases.
Demographic and Achievement Variables
Our dataset also included counts of movers and stayers by race/ethnicity, which
we used to calculate variables for the percentages of students attending the districts and
charter schools in our sample that were eligible to re-enroll by race/ethnicity and the
race/ethnicity of movers. These variables allow us to assess the possible impact of
student mobility on district and charter school demographics. That is, do the patterns
have the potential to increase racial segregation in districts and charter schools?
Once the dataset was constructed, we merged it with additional variables drawn
from the CCD and state achievement data. Two additional demographic variables are
drawn from the CCD: a) the percentage of students in the district or charter school who
have an individual education plan (IEP); and b) the percentage of students eligible for
free and reduced lunch. For district and charter school achievement, we used the
6

See also Carlson et al. (2011), which retained small districts in multivariate analyses.
Nineteen small elementary districts located outside of CBSAs were not included in the analysis. The
majority (63%) of these served fewer than 100 students. Likewise, there were eight unified school
districts, all located outside of CBSAs, that served fewer than 13,000 students in total in 2010-11 that were
not included in the analysis.
7
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district-level Normal Curve Equivalent (NCE) on the state-administered Terra Nova
tests in Reading, Language Arts, and Mathematics, which we averaged across all
elementary grades tested. Because the 2007-08 scores were released after the 2008-09
school year began, we used the 2006-07 test results because it was the achievement data
that was publicly available when families were making their schooling decisions for
2008-2009.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. After providing descriptive statistics for both
sectors, we analyze the patterns of movement to and from school districts and to and
from charter schools separately. We begin by analyzing each type of within-CBSA
movement, using regression models. Next we analyze how mobility flows work
together by identifying high and low mobility districts. Our final analysis examines
mobility within the three largest CBSAs in the state: Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, Tucson,
and Yuma.
Results
Our full sample contained 177 school districts and 233 charter schools.8 While
the descriptive statistics provided in Table 1 highlight important differences between the
two sectors, the sizable standard deviations on most variables indicate that there was
considerable variation within each group. For example, while charter schools served far
fewer elementary grade students than the school districts, there was also a wide range in
district size (from four elementary grade students who were eligible to re-enroll to more
than 32,000). The median district served approximately 600 elementary grade students.

8

Charters operated by the same educational management organization (EMO) essentially function as a
district in the analysis and are treated as districts in CCD and the state achievement data. Our sample
contained 233 of the 281 elementary-serving charter schools that were open during both years of the study.
The loss in cases is due in part because the charter schools were treated as districts when the data was
aggregated.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics by Sector

Students End 2007-08 (#)
Total Movers (#)
Students Beg. 2008-09 (#)
Total Incoming (#)
Percentage difference
Mobility Variables
Movers (%)
Movers to Local School Districts
Movers to Local Charter Schools
Incoming (%)
Incoming from Local School Districts
Incoming from Local Charter Schools
Demographic and Achievement Variables
End of 2007-08 (%)
White
Hispanic
African American
American Indian
Asian American
Movers (%)
White
Hispanic
African American
American Indian
Asian American
IEP (%)
IEP missing (%)
FRL students (%)
FRL students missing
Mean NCE Reading
Mean NCE Language Arts
Mean NCE Mathematics
Achievement Missing
Locale
City
Suburb
Town
Rural
*p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001

https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol25/iss3/6

School Districts
(N=177)
Mean (S.D.)
2598 (4809)
207 (324)
2590 (4781)
196 (324)
-.85 (6.41)

Charter Schools
(N=233)
Mean (S.D.)
187 (240)
35 (56)
190 (239)
39 (66)
13.13 (107.47)

9.25 (6.12)
53.54 (29.08)
12.53 (14.38)
8.40 (4.32)
55.58 (30.45)
9.66 (10.62)

21.69 (11.91)***
66.06 (22.54)***
21.41 (17.59)**
22.75 (16.39)***
67.22 (24.48)***
20.03 (19.21)***

46.14 (29.32)
39.72 (28.45)
2.90 (3.72)
9.81 (23.53)
1.43 (1.79)

55.37 (28.65)
28.65 (25.72)**
6.81 (7.92)***
6.07 (17.39)**
3.10 (3.82)***

47.84 (30.36)
33.47 (27.32)
3.96 (5.80)
11.61 (24.50)
1.43 (2.82)
12.83 (5.49)
.02 (.15)
55.26 (24.95)
.12 (.33)
49.32 (7.13)
48.97 (6.72)
49.72 (7.35)
.08
N (%)
26 (15)
12 (7)
33 (19)
106 (60)

53.52 (29.34)
28.39 (26.30)
7.67 (11.48)***
6.25 (17.33)***
3.30 (6.89)***
9.31 (7.96)
.06 (.24)***
47.10 (28.30)**
.30 (.46)***
51.79 (10.52)***
51.87 (10.73)***
51.34 (11.21)***
.13
N (%)
132 (57)
41 (18)
20 (9)
40 (17)

12

Powers et al.: The Dynamics of Public School Choice in Arizona

We began by examining general mobility patterns by sector before distinguishing
between movement to and from charter schools, which is clearly active choice, and other
types of mobility. We used t-tests to assess the statistical significance of the betweensector differences in means we observed. Our initial analysis indicated that on average,
9% of the students attending local school districts and 22% of students attending charter
schools enrolled in a new district or charter school between the end of the 2007-08 and
the beginning of the 2008-09 academic year. The percentage of students entering each
sector roughly mirrored these figures (Table 1). In general, school districts and charter
schools with high rates of movers (out-migration) also had relatively high percentages of
incoming students (in-migration). The correlation between the percentage of students
moving out of districts or charter schools and the percentage of incoming students
was .58 (n = 410, p < .001). 9 The sample of charter schools had, on average, much
higher rates of both in- and out-migration than the school districts.
When we disaggregated the overall mobility rates to examine how much student
movement occurred within the CBSA and by destination, it was clear that interdistrict
mobility in Arizona is substantial. Even though charter schools have higher rates of
mobility overall, because they are a much smaller sector of local public school
“markets,” there are many more students moving between school districts than between
charter schools. These figures also indicate that interdistrict mobility in Arizona was
higher than in Colorado and Minnesota over the same period (Carlson et al., 2011). In
addition, the percentage of students who entered charter schools from local school
districts was similar to the percentage of students who exited charter schools for local
school districts, which suggested a two-way pattern of student movement (Authors,
2012). On average, about two-thirds of the students leaving school districts moved
within the CBSA (54% to another district and 13% to a charter school), compared to
87% of charter school students. A majority (66%) of students leaving charter schools
moved to school districts within the CBSA while 21% moved to local charter schools.
The state averages for incoming students roughly mirrored those of movers in each
sector. These figures suggest that a substantial portion of charter school mobility is due
to active choice, and one important type of active choice is enrollment in a school
district after attending a charter school.
The 177 school districts in our sample served a lower percentage of White,
African American, and Asian students and a higher percentage of Hispanic and
American Indian students than the charter schools. Many of the differences in
demographic composition were statistically significant. The racial demographics of the
students who left our school districts were similar to the demographics of the school
districts, as were the demographics of incoming students (not shown). As a result, the
racial demographics of the elementary grade students enrolled in either sector changed
very little from the end of 2007-08 to the beginning of 2008-09. School districts also
served higher percentages of students with Individual Education Plans (IEPs) and
9

Our main variables of interest account for district or charter school size because they are the number of
movers or incoming students by sector, divided by the total number of elementary students eligible to reenroll. There were no substantial differences in the correlations when the sample was divided by sector.
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students eligible for free and reduced lunch and the cross-sector differences were
statistically significant. However, a substantial number of districts (12%) and charter
schools (30%) were missing information on the latter.
Student achievement in the charter schools was marginally higher than
achievement in the school districts across all subjects, and t-tests indicated that the
differences in achievement were statistically significant. Most of the charter schools
(75%) were located in cities and suburbs, while more than half of the school districts
were in rural areas. In the analysis that follows, we begin with a more detailed analysis
of mobility to and from school districts, followed by our analysis of charter schools.
School Districts
We used a subset of the variables shown in Table 1 to predict the characteristics
associated with each type of mobility using ordinary least squares regression (OLS).
The variables in the models predicting the percentage of movers (columns 1 and 2) were
the characteristics of the districts students were moving from, while the variables in the
models for percentage of incoming students were the characteristics of the districts
students were moving to. Because we were missing information on the variables for the
percentage of students with an IEP and achievement, our final model is based on a
reduced sample of 161 school districts. However, t-tests indicated that there were no
differences between the full sample and the regression sample (the descriptive statistics
for the regression sample are provided in Appendix 1).10 Percentage White students is
the omitted variable. Because districts varied considerably in the percentage of movers
or incoming students and size (see Table 1), we also included these variables in the
model. For the latter we used the number of eligible students who could re-enroll in an
elementary grade (Students End 2007-08) as a proxy for district size. We also included
the indicator variables for locale; city is the omitted comparison category.
Larger districts had more incoming students from charter schools, which is likely
because larger districts are more likely to have a greater number of charter schools
within or near their boundaries. Student demographic variables were associated with
some, but not all forms of student movement to and from school districts. For example,
school districts with higher percentages of Hispanic students were more likely to have
higher rates of movement to and from local school districts, which may reflect the high
rates of mobility among these groups. Districts with higher percentages of Hispanic
students also had lower rates of mobility to charter schools. The results for the
percentages of African American, American Indian and Asian American students were
less consistent across the models, which is likely because these are relatively small
demographic groups compared to Hispanic and White students. All else held equal, the
percentage of students with IEPs was negatively associated with movement to charter
schools. This may be because families receiving special education services in a school
district are less likely to be attracted to charter schools, which tend to have less capacity
to provide such services. Charter schools could also discourage families whose children
10

We did not include percentage of free and reduced lunch students in the final model because it would
have resulted in a substantial loss of cases for both districts and charter schools.
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have disabilities from enrolling (Zetino, 2017). IEP services may also be a pull factor
that encourages families to remain enrolled in a school district.
Districts with lower student achievement had higher rates of movement to charter
schools, which is not surprising. Yet districts with higher achievement had higher rates
of student movement to other school districts. This finding is inconsistent with the
theory underlying school choice reforms; we would expect that students would be more
likely to remain enrolled in higher performing districts. Our models could also reflect
two different dimensions of student mobility: a) reactive mobility between small
districts serving high percentages of poor and minority students, and b) active choice of
students within higher achieving districts who seek to move to districts with higher
achievement than the districts they initially enrolled in (Carlson et al., 2011). However,
the achievement of the receiving district was not a significant predictor of student
movement into school districts from other districts or from charter schools. Interdistrict
choice – which may or may not be a form of active choice – was the dominant form of
school choice overall and the main form of student movement in districts with high
percentages of underrepresented minority students. In addition, there were no clear
patterns between student movement and student achievement. Finally, districts located
in towns had less movement to and from school districts, which could reflect their
relative isolation compared to urban districts.
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Table 2
Regression Analyses Predicting Mobility from and to School Districts.
Movers to
Movers to Local Incoming from
Local School
Charter Schools
Local School
Districts (%)
(%)
Districts (%)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Constant
-28.89
84.98***
37.21
(28.09)
(14.63)
(28.35)
Movers (%)
1.83***
-.13
(.45)
(.24)
Incoming (%)
.29
(.52)
Students End 2007-08
.0004
.0004
-.0000
(.001)
(.00)
(.001)
Hispanic
.48***
-.29***
.34**
(.10)
(.05)
(.10)
African American
.85
.05
2.09**
(.72)
(.38)
(.70)
American Indian
.21
-.29 ***
.02
(.12)
(.06)
(.12)
Asian American
.95
1.00
1.45
(1.61)
(.84)
(1.57)
IEP
-.17
-.50*
-.70
(.48)
(.25)
(.48)
Mean NCE Mathematics .83*
-1.03***
.16
(.42)
(.22)
(.42)
Suburb
6.25
-1.35
5.16
(8.40)
(4.38)
(8.47)
Town
-16.46*
2.83
-18.10*
(7.25)
(3.77)
(7.30)
Rural
-3.18
-3.22
-3.43
(6.66)
(4.47)
(6.72)
R2 (N=161)
.40
+p< .10. *p< .05. **p<.01 ***p< .001

.28

.41

Incoming from
Local Charter
Schools (%)
(4)
13.85
(11.68)

.32
(.21)
.001**
(.00)
-.07
(.04)
-.26
(.29)
-.003
(.05)
1.37*
(.65)
-.04
(.20)
-.08
(.17)
-3.04
(3.49)
-.13
(3.01)
-2.79
(2.77)
.22

While the regression analyses provide insights into the factors that, on average,
have the strongest relationships with the different types of mobility we identified, we
were also interested in understanding the joint effect of student inflow and outflow on
districts and charter schools. That is, were some districts and charter schools
experiencing high rates of loss via students leaving without similar rates of student
inflow or vice versa? In our initial analysis, we found that in general, within the 27 city
and suburban districts in metropolitan Phoenix, districts with high percentages of
movers also had high rates of incoming students (Authors, 2012). To determine if this
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pattern held with the statewide sample, we identified the districts that were in the lowest
and highest quartiles for movement in and out of the district and cross-classified them,
as shown in Table 3. Table 4 provides the characteristics of each group of schools.
Table 3
Cross-Classification of Districts by Mobility Quartiles
School Districts
Low %
High %
Movers
Movers
Low % Incoming
22
3
High % Incoming
3
25
Just over half of the districts (25) that had the highest percentages of exiting
students were also among the districts with the highest percentages of entering students,
which we describe as high mobility districts. Similarly, half of the districts with the
lowest percentages of exiting students also were among the districts with the lowest
percentages of exiting students (low mobility districts). Few districts had very high rates
of out-migration and low rates of in-migration or vice versa. Nine of the high mobility
districts were small districts with fewer than 100 students in the sample; in only three of
these a handful of students moved to a charter school within the CBSA. Most of the
high mobility districts (80%) were rural districts, so the demographic characteristics of
this group closely matched the profile of the rural districts in the sample, which were
smaller and served higher percentages of White students than the full sample of
districts.11 On average, 80% of the exiting students in high mobility districts enrolled in
another district or charter school within the CBSA, although there was a substantial
amount of variation within the group.

11

Descriptive statistics for rural districts available on request.
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Table 4
Districts by Mobility Types

1110 (1323)
152 (179)
1113 (1334)
155 (186)

Low
Mobility
(N=22)
Mean (S.D.)
1983 (3185)
88 (171)
1985 (3187)
91 (174)

18.08 (26.06)
66.40 (26.07)
13.82 (17.97)
14.24 (3.51)
69.42 (30.38)
8.26 (10.60)

3.51 (1.53)
38.26 (30.22)
16.04 (22.56)
3.50 (1.65)
37.99 (32.66)
8.45 (11.09)

49.36 (33.16)
5.41 (5.78)
41.30 (28.17)
2.22 (2.70)
1.72 (1.75)

41.46 (37.34)
.76 (1.03)
45.56 (41.30)
11.45 (25.44)
.75 (.95)

54.04 (35.28)
6.62 (8.81)
34.83 (27.81)
3.12 (4.48)
1.40 (2.18)
14.03 (8.40)
0
51.76 (24.25)
.16
47.93 (6.82)
47.04 (4.77)
48.23 (5.66)
.24
N (%)
2 (8)
1 (4)
2 (8)
20 (80)

36.11 (35.49)
.76 (2.00)
36.90 (38.82)
16.25 (29.38)
.88 (1.56)
26.48 (21.18)
.09
59.36 (25.93)
.13
47.19 (6.56)
47.56 (6.05)
47.74 (6.52)
.09
N (%)
3 (14)
0
10 (45)
9 (41)

High Mobility
(N=25)
Mean (S.D.)

Students End 2007-08 (#)
Total Movers (#)
Students Beg. 2008-09 (#)
Total Incoming (#)
Mobility Variables
Movers (%)
Movers to Local School Districts
Movers to Local Charter Schools
Incoming (%)
Incoming from Local School Districts
Incoming from Local Charter Schools
Demographic and Achievement
Variables
End of 2007-08 (%)
White
Hispanic
African American
American Indian
Asian American
Movers (%)
White
Hispanic
African American
American Indian
Asian American
IEP (%)
IEP missing (%)
FRL students (%)
FRL students missing
Mean NCE Reading
Mean NCE Language Arts
Mean NCE Mathematics

Achievement Missing
Locale
City
Suburb
Town
Rural
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In contrast, only three of the low mobility districts served fewer than 100
students, and two of these were extremely small districts with less than 10 students.
Fifty-four percent of the students who left these districts moved to other districts or
charter schools within the CBSA, which suggests that almost half of the students who
moved left the local area. Low mobility districts also served a substantially higher
percentage of American Indian students than the average for school districts, which
indicates that many of these districts are located in or near reservations. On average,
high and low mobility districts served a higher percentage of students with IEPs than the
full sample of schools, but the percentage of students with IEPs in low mobility districts
was more than twice the average of the full sample (see Table 1), which suggests that
special education services may be an important factor keeping families enrolled in
school districts. Conversely, on average high mobility districts served lower percentages
of students receiving free and reduced lunch than the full sample, while low mobility
districts served higher percentages of free and reduced lunch students.
Although low mobility and high mobility districts did not differ substantially in
average achievement, both were slightly below the state average. 12 In general, student
mobility to and from school districts was only weakly related to district achievement. If
student mobility to and from districts was driven by district achievement, then we would
expect the highest achieving districts to have the highest percentages of in-migration and
the lowest percentages of out-migration, but this was not the case. For example, only 10
of the districts in the highest quartile for mathematics achievement were also among the
districts with the highest percentage of incoming students. Finally, except for two small
districts with fewer than 50 students in the sample the demographics of the highest
mobility districts did not change substantially from 2007-08 to 2008-09. 13 In these
districts the movement of 10 students made a substantial difference (changes of five
percentage points or more) in the distribution of students by race.
Charter Schools
In Table 5 we repeat the regression analyses we conducted on the school district
sample with the charter school sample. As in the analyses shown in Table 2, the
variables in the models predicting the percentage of movers (columns 1 and 2) were the
characteristics of the charter schools the students were moving from, while the variables
in the models for percentage of incoming students were the characteristics of the charter
school students were moving to. Because we were missing information on the variables
for the percent of students with an IEP and achievement, our final model is based on a
reduced sample of 198 charter schools. As with the district sample, t-tests indicated that
there were no differences between the full sample and the regression sample (see
12

This pattern held when we looked at district achievement for the districts with the highest percentage of
movers. Average mathematics achievement for these 37 districts was less than two percentage points
lower than the remaining 125 districts (achievement data was not available for 15 districts).
13
For example, 54% of the students leaving high mobility districts were White, as were 57% of the
students moving into the district. As a result, the demographics of eligible movers in this group of
districts were virtually the same over the two periods we analyzed.
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Appendix 1). In contrast to the school district models, the variables for percentage of
movers and percentage of incoming students were statistically significant and mirrored
each other, indicating that in general, students from charter schools with higher
percentages of movers were moving to other charter schools. Likewise, charter schools
with higher percentages of incoming students had higher percentages of students coming
into the schools from other charter schools rather than school districts. As the percentage
of Asian American students in a charter school increased, the percentage of students
moving to another charter school increased, although this finding is difficult to assess
given the relatively small percentages of Asian American students enrolled in Arizona’s
school districts and charter schools.
The statistically significant coefficients for achievement could reflect the
location of charter schools. Charter schools with higher percentages of incoming
students from school districts tend to be located within or near the boundaries of lower
achieving school districts, which is reflected by the negative coefficient for achievement
and vice versa. Charter schools with higher percentages of incoming students from local
charter schools tend to be located in or near districts with higher achievement. The
positive coefficient for movement to school districts and the negative coefficients for
movement to and from charter schools for charter schools located in towns and rural
areas likely reflects the limited numbers of charter schools in these areas. Finally, the R2
was relatively low for all models. Comparing across the regression models for school
districts and charter schools suggests that there were different processes underlying
student movement between districts compared to student movement between districts
and charter schools.
Table 5
Regression Analyses Predicting Mobility from and to Charter Schools
Movers to Local Movers to
Incoming
School Districts Local Charter from Local
(%)
Schools (%)
School
Districts (%)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Constant
92.89***
14.14
117.89***
(7.36)
(14.14)
(18.22)
Movers (%)
-.38*
.22+
(.15)
(.12)
Incoming (%)
-.37**
(.13)
Students End 2007-8
-.004
-.005
.0002
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Hispanic
.01
-.04
-.05
(.08)
(.06)
(.09)
African American
.27
-.09
.08
(.21)
(.17)
(.23)
American Indian
-.014
.07
-.009
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Incoming
from Local
Charter
Schools (%)
(4)
-5.17
(13.55)

.32***
(.09)
-.002
(.01)
-.08
(.06)
.13
(.17)
.06
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Asian American
IEP
Mean NCE
Mathematics
suburb
town
rural
R2 (N=198)

(.11)
-.83+
(.44)
-.14
(.32)
-.32
(.23)
4.44
(3.80)
-1.90
(5.31)
8.76*
(4.45)

(.09)
.81*
(.36)
-.09
(.26)
.12
(.19)
-.07
(3.10)
-11.27*
(4.32)
-15.04***
(3.62)

(.12)
-.68
(.48)
-.51
(.36)
-.64*
(.25)
-1.28
4.22
-3.29
(5.91)
-.84
(4.90)

(.09)
.47
(.36)
-.20
(.28)
.44**
(.18)
1.79
(3.13)
-8.65*
(4.39)
-5.53
(3.64)

.11

.19

.12

.22

As with the analysis of school districts presented above, we cross-classified the
charter schools that were in the highest and lowest mobility quartiles. The patterns of
mobility for charter schools mirrored those of the school districts. Forty-three percent of
the charter schools that had the highest rates of out-migration also had the highest rates
of in-migration. Likewise, half of the charter schools with the lowest rates of outmigration also had the lowest rates of in-migration. High mobility charter schools
ranged from some extremely small schools (two enrolled fewer than 10 elementary
school students who were eligible to re-enroll at the end of 2007-08) to the largest
charter school in the sample, which served over 2,200 elementary school students in
2007-08. Low mobility charter schools ranged in size from one rural charter school that
enrolled 10 elementary school students to another rural charter school with more than
1,500 students. In general, the rural charter schools had the lowest mobility rates, which
could reflect the limited education markets in those areas. Most of the high mobility
charter schools were located in urban areas, although five of the 25 (20%) were located
in rural areas.
Table 6
Cross-Classification of Charter Schools by Mobility Quartiles
Charter Schools
Low
% High
%
Movers
Movers
Low % Incoming
30
5
High % Incoming
4
25
Compared to low mobility charter schools, high mobility charter schools served
lower percentages of White and Asian American students and higher percentages of
African American and Hispanic students. Both high and low mobility charter schools
served higher percentages of students with IEPs than the full sample of charter schools;
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however, high mobility schools served substantially higher percentages of students who
were eligible for free and reduced lunch than the full sample and low mobility schools,
which may be a function of locale as a majority of the high mobility schools were
located in urban areas.
High mobility charter schools also had lower achievement than the full sample of
charter schools and substantially lower achievement than low mobility charter schools
(between 12 and 17 percentage points depending on the subject). This pattern is
consistent with what we might expect if families are choosing schools based on student
achievement. Yet fewer than half (39%) of the charter schools in the lowest quartile for
achievement were among the schools with the highest rates of outgoing students.
Likewise, only 12% of the lowest achieving charter schools were among the schools
with the lowest rates of incoming students, which suggests that families’ choices of
charter schools are not primarily driven by quality as measured by student achievement.
Because many of the high mobility charter schools were small (19 of the 25 served 100
or fewer elementary students), the movement of a few students could substantially
change the demographics of a school or group of schools from one year to the next.
That said, as a group, the only major change in demographics was that the highest
mobility charter schools served approximately four percent fewer White students and the
percentage of Hispanic students they served increased by approximately the same
amount.
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Table 7
Charter Schools by Mobility Types

# Students End 2007-08
# Students Beg. 2008-09
Percent Movers
% Moving to Local School Districts
% Moving to Local Charter Schools
Percent Incoming
% Incoming from Local School Districts
% Incoming from Local Charter Schools
End of 2007-08
% White
% African American
% Hispanic
% American Indian
% Asian American
Movers
% White
% African American
% Hispanic
% American Indian
% Asian American

IEP (%)
IEP missing
FRL students (%)
FRL students missing
Mean NCE Reading
Mean NCE Language Arts
Mean NCE Mathematics

Achievement Missing
Locale
City
Suburb
Town
Rural

High Mobility
(N=25)
Mean (S.D.)
165 (446)
180 (463)
41.66 (11.65)
55.31 (26.10)
19.53 (17.28)
45.15 (13.58)
61.13 (26.26)
18.12 (19.11)

Low Mobility
(N=30)
Mean (S.D.)
371 (350)
361 (339)
8.01 (3.59)
66.19 (25.69 )
18.36 (19.02)
6.15 (2.77)
67.24 (28.36)
20.80 (21.32)

54.40 (26.10)
8.40 (7.54)
25.95 (21.70)
8.14 (12.20)
3.11 (3.75)

66.10 (30.39)
2.94 (3.03)
18.65 (24.29)
7.85 (24.19)
4.46 (5.02)

54.30 (26.92)
7.49 (9.20)
23.20 (21.82)
12.57 (18.32)
2.44 (5.04)
12.19 (7.70)
.12
54.76 (27.37)
.20
45.23 (7.73)
45.96 (8.29)
42.02 (7.75)
.20
N (%)
16 (64)
2 (8)
2 (8)
5 (20)

64.42 (33.86)
2.64 (4.09)
18.38 (23.24)
5.87 (20.14)
5.36 (10.03)
13.13 (20.63)
.03
31.94 (31.54)
.23
58.13 (10.12)
57.78 (10.39)
58.53 (11.34)
.03
N (%)
11 (37)
7 (23)
4 (13)
8 (27)

CBSA Analysis
Our final analysis compared district mobility and charter school mobility within
and across the three CBSAs where the largest numbers of students in the state reside:
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, Tucson, and Yuma. These three CBSAs served 86% of the
students attending traditional public schools in Arizona. We provide descriptive
statistics for the school districts and charter schools within the CBSA. We also created
maps of the CBSAs showing the districts and charter schools in our samples using
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ArcGIS. The maps depict the districts and charter schools within each CBSA; the
districts are shaded based on the average of percent movers and percent incoming.14 This
analysis allowed us to better understand and compare the spatial dimensions of three
very different educational markets, and visually represent the relationship between
charter school location and interdistrict mobility (Lubienki & Lee, 2017) in a way that
cannot be captured in a table of descriptive statistics. However, the descriptive statistics
also helped us interpret some of the patterns we identified using the maps.

14

The scale of the mobility variable on the three maps is different because district mobility varied across
the three CBSAs.
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Table 8
Descriptive Statistics by CBSA and Sector

# Students End 2007-08
# Students Beg. 2008-09
Percent Movers
% Moving to Local School Districts
% Moving to Local Charter Schools
Percent Incoming
% Incoming from Local School Districts
% Incoming From Local Charter Schools
End of 2007-08
% White
% African American
% Hispanic
% American Indian
% Asian American
IEP (%)
IEP missing
FRL students (%)
FRL students missing
Mean NCE Reading
Mean NCE Language Arts
Mean NCE Mathematics
Achievement missing
Locale
City
Suburb
Town
Rural
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Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale
Tucson
Districts
Charters
Districts
Charters
(N=64)
(N=139)
(N=14)
(N=41)
Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.)
5095 (6322)
216 (286) 4392 (7010)
159 (163)
5080 (6300)
220 (283) 4378 (6876)
162 (169)
9.86 (4.49) 22.55 (11.72)
6.96 (2.70) 22.88 (12.62)
73.63 (18.98) 69.29 (18.88) 60.53 (20.02) 58.25 (26.52)
15.25 (11.22) 23.57 (14.84) 16.29 (8.68) 27.54 (23.22)
9.98 (4.05) 24.61 (18.28)
7.31 (1.75) 21.45 (13.76)
75.17 (17.92) 71.54 (20.28) 65.46 (17.05) 60.49 (28.25)
12.52 (9.49) 23.12 (18.64) 14.57 (8.24) 21.85 (21.22)

Yuma
Districts
Charters
(N=8)
(N=3)
Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.)
1999 (2389)
286 (232)
1990 (2363)
305 (238)
5.42 (1.92) 10.81 (3.54)
69.40 (16.99) 85.05 (2.18)
9.09 (10.43)
6.86 (8.71)
4.93 (2.87) 21.27 (14.14)
79.19 (19.36) 89.03 (11.14)
4.49 (5.83)
3.60 (5.17)

36.84 (27.18)
5.67 (4.56)
50.63 (26.53)
4.73 (12.27)
2.14 (1.90)
12.13 (4.17)
0
52.90 (27.74)
.09
47.64 (7.23)
47.63 (7.14)
48.29 (7.26)
.02
N (%)
20 (31)
7 (11)
6 (9)
31 (48)

17.88 (12.58) 34.86 (23.30)
.92 (1.19)
3.31 (.79)
79.34 (12.88) 55.72 (27.80)
1.42 (1.23)
2.98 (1.85)
.44 (.77)
3.14 (3.72)
10.32 (2.50)
8.22 (2.80)
0
0
79.48 (14.55) 63.91 (19.05)
.13
0
45.02 (5.36) 48.42 (5.15)
47.43 (4.56) 49.58 (6.19)
47.78 (4.53) 47.56 (5.59)
.13
0
N (%)
N (%)
2 (25)
3 (100)
0
0
2 (25)
0
4 (50)
0

54.62 (27.42)
9.20 (8.93)
27.78 (24.19)
4.94 (15.20)
3.46 (4.12)
8.67 (8.90)
.05
43.27 (29.13)
.35
51.97 (10.14)
52.42 (10.29)
51.76 (11.02)
.14
N (%)
87 (63)
31 (22)
3 (2)
18 (13)

44.24 (23.97)
2.73 (2.01)
40.25 (22.52)
10.34 (25.85)
2.44 (3.04)
13.88 (4.29)
.07
37.90 (32.91)
.21
52.38 (8.94)
52.08 (8.59)
53.25 (9.59)
.07
N (%)
2 (14)
5 (36)
1 (7)
6 (43)

46.92 (26.65)
5.53 (4.78)
38.57 (26.66)
5.33 (14.99)
3.64 (4.02)
11.96 (13.23)
.10
54.78 (29.63)
.39
52.53 (12.50)
52.62 (11.91)
52.58 (13.45)
.15
N (%)
31 (76)
7 (17)
1 (2)
2 (5)
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Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale. In the Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale CBSA, there
are 64 districts that range from small rural districts serving fewer than 100
students, small central city elementary districts that serve between 1,200 and
20,000 students and large unified districts serving 25,000 students or more. There
are 11 small elementary districts in the central city area that feed into a single
high school district. Four other elementary districts classified by the U.S. Census
Bureau as city districts send students to high school districts with attendance
boundaries that cross the Phoenix city limits. The five remaining city districts
located north and east of the central city area are larger unified districts. Figure 1
illustrates how charter schools in the Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale CBSA are fairly
evenly distributed across the central city area and within the largest district in the
CBSA, the Mesa Unified School District. The map also highlights how there are
relatively few charter schools in some of the districts with the highest mobility
shown in blue, as well as a substantial number of charter schools distributed
across in the lowest mobility districts, which are shown in yellow.
To provide a snapshot of the range of student movement patterns within
the CBSA, we compared movement patterns to and from the 15 elementary
districts with those of the three unified districts that are classified as large city
districts in the CCD. The two groups of districts had very different demographic
profiles. In Arizona’s public schools, the two largest demographic groups are
Whites and Hispanics, which were fairly evenly represented in the districts and
charter schools included in our analysis. The 15 elementary districts were
predominantly Hispanic in 2007-08 (69% on average), while the unified districts
were majority White (71%). Likewise, the elementary school districts served a
much higher percentage of free and reduced lunch students (70%) than the unified
districts (25%). On average, 11% of the students attending schools in the central
city elementary districts in 2007-08 moved to other districts or charter schools at
the beginning of 2008-09. Virtually all of these students moved within the
CBSA; most (82%) moved to other districts and another 13% moved to charter
schools. The figures for incoming students to the districts were roughly the same
although the average rate of incoming students from charter schools was slightly
lower (11%). The unified districts had lower overall rates of movement out of the
districts (five percent on average) and while 92% of the movers went to districts
or charter schools within the CBSA, they moved to charter schools at a much
higher rate (22%). As with the elementary districts, the figures for incoming
students mirrored those of the outgoing students. Overall, these patterns indicate
that the unified districts in the Phoenix metropolitan area tended to serve more
advantaged students who are more likely to engage in active choice.
While we found similar differences between the elementary and unified
districts in the much smaller (seven in total) group of suburban districts in the
CBSA, within the rural districts there did not seem to be a clear difference
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between the movement patterns of elementary and unified districts. On average,
the rates of movement in and out of the rural districts were similar to the city
elementary districts (10% and 11%, respectively), although comparatively fewer
(85%) of the students attending rural districts moved within the CBSA. Both
rural and suburban districts were more diverse than their central city counterparts.
While the percentage of Hispanic students was slightly higher than the percentage
of White students in both groups of districts, neither group was a majority.
Except for rural charter schools, which had lower average rates of out-migration
(17%) and higher rates of in-migration (25%) than all charter schools in the
CBSA, we did not find any clear differences in the mobility patterns across
groups of charter schools when we divided them by locale.21

21

The pattern was the reverse for the three charter schools located in areas classified as towns by
the U.S. Census Bureau but it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from such a small group of
schools.
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Figure 1
Phoenix CBSA School Districts by Average Mobility and Charter Schools
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Tucson. Most of the charter schools in the Tucson CBSA are located
within the Tucson Unified School District (TUSD). There are smaller numbers of
charter schools within the unified school districts that adjoin TUSD: Sunnyside,
Flowing Wells, and Amphitheater (see Figure 2). TUSD, Sunnyside and
Ampitheater served the largest numbers of students in the CBSA. While it did not
have the highest percentage of students leaving the district, 32% of the students
who left TUSD at the end of 2007-08 attended charter schools within the CBSA
in 2008-09. While TUSD’s rate of incoming students was slightly lower than the
rate of outgoing students, close to the same share (28%) of those incoming
students left charter schools to attend traditional public schools in TUSD. Not
surprisingly, given the number of charter schools within and near its borders,
TUSD had the highest rates of charter school in-migration and out-migration
within the CBSA. The mobility patterns for the surrounding districts were similar
but not as extreme – relatively high rates of out-migration to charter schools and
similar rates of in-migration from charter schools.
Unlike the Yuma and Phoenix CBSAs, on average the districts in the
Tucson CBSA served approximately the same percentages of White and Hispanic
students as the charter schools. The school districts in the Tucson CBSA served a
substantially higher percentage of American Indian students than the charter
schools. One of the state’s largest American Indian reservations is located within
the Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified School District, a rural district that is
geographically distant from the urban center where charter schools are
concentrated (see Figure 2). In 2007-08, 97% of the students in the sample
attending schools in Indian Oasis were American Indian.22 Finally, also unlike
Yuma and Phoenix, average student achievement was approximately the same in
the districts and charter schools within the Tucson CBSA, although the higher
standard deviation for the charter schools indicates that there was greater variation
in achievement within the charter schools in the CBSA than there was across the
school districts.

22

Because there were a substantial number of districts and charter schools missing information on
the percentage of free and reduced lunch students served, it is difficult to draw clear cross-sector
comparisons on that variable.
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Figure 2
Tucson CBSA School Districts by Average Mobility and Charter Schools

Yuma. Of the three CBSAs, the Yuma school districts and charter schools had
the lowest mobility rates. While the charter schools appear to have a high rate of
incoming students, given that they served 5% of the elementary students in the
sample in 2007-08, the number of students moving to charter schools is fairly
small. Within the Yuma CBSA, the three districts with the highest average
mobility (shown in blue in Figure 3) were also the districts with the highest
percentage of students leaving the districts (movers) and did not have any students
leave for charter schools or enter the district from charter schools. This is likely
because they were geographically distant from the charter schools in the CBSA.
Because these were among the smallest districts in the CBSA in terms of
enrollment, the absolute numbers of students leaving and entering the districts
was low. In the four largest districts in the CBSA, between 11% and 24% of their
movers left to attend charter schools. However, between five and 16% of their
incoming students entered from charter schools. These districts adjoin one other
in the Southwest corner of the state. As Figure 3 highlights, the three charter
schools in the sample are clustered within two miles of one another in the Yuma
Elementary District near the border of the Crane Elementary District, and within
10 miles of the other two districts’ borders. Finally, the demographics of the two
sectors varied considerably. While only 17% of the students attending public
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schools in the school district were Hispanic, 35% of the charter school students
were White. Likewise, the three charter schools served a substantially lower
percentage of free and reduced price lunch students (64% on average) than the
school districts (79%).
Figure 3
Yuma CBSA School Districts by Average Mobility and Charter Schools
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In all three CBSAs, charter schools served a higher percentage of African
American students than the school districts although their overall representation in
the sample was low. In both Yuma and Phoenix, the charter schools served a
substantially higher percentage of White students and a substantially lower
percentage of Hispanic students, which may be an outcome of White flight to
charter schools in these education markets. As in our previous analyses, the
demographics of eligible re-enrollees in these school districts and charter schools
changed very little from 2007-08 to 2008-09.
Discussion
While most analyses tend to focus on understanding the effects of a single
school choice policy such as student movement from traditional public schools to
charter schools, we assessed how students move between different sectors of the
public school market in Arizona, a state with long-standing public school choice
policies. By analyzing interdistrict and charter school mobility simultaneously,
we provide a more nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics of public
school choice. Not only do patterns of student movement to and from charter
schools differ from movement between school districts, but public school choice
policies also affect districts in varied, yet systematic ways. That said, the use of
enrollment data provides only suggestive insights into the motivations behind
these enrollment decisions – namely, whether the mobility patterns explored
above were the result of active or reactive school choice.
Our basic finding across these analyses is that even in a state with a wellestablished charter school movement, most student movement is interdistrict
mobility or movement between school districts. Given that the charter school
sector in Arizona is small relative to the traditional public school sector and
charter schools are not evenly distributed across the state, this is not surprising.
Although proportionally, charter schools tend to have higher rates of students
leaving or entering schools than school districts, in absolute terms, these are
relatively small numbers of students. The average charter school received 24
students at the beginning of the 2008-09 academic year from school districts
within the CBSA and eight students from local charter schools. In contrast, on
average 179 students left school districts for other districts or charter schools
within the CBSA: 142 to school districts and 37 to charter schools. In both cases,
the figures for incoming students mirror those of outgoing students. Thus, the
type of public school choice that is the most well-known and receives the most
attention from policymakers is not the dominant form of school choice in Arizona.
In most districts, over half of exiting and entering students move within the CBSA.
This suggests that, to the extent they are competing for student enrollment, school
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districts are largely competing with other school districts rather than charter
schools. In Arizona, interdistrict mobility has played a greater role in creating
and sustaining the “educational market” than charter schools. Because students
may move between school districts within a CBSA because of household changes
that prompt a school move, we cannot definitively attribute this form of student
movement to active choice.
While in some districts a substantial percentage of students leave to attend
charter schools, students are also leaving charter schools to attend traditional
public schools at roughly similar rates. That is, mobility between charter schools
and school districts is two-way. While charters schools may attract students away
from traditional public school districts when they are initially enrolling in schools,
in general, charter school students are a fairly mobile group and most students
who leave charter schools enroll in school districts. Yet in absolute terms this is a
small number of students. Although there is considerable variation in student
mobility between districts and charter schools, overall these patterns of student
movement did not alter what are by now well-established patterns of stratification
within and across each sector.
Our regression analyses, which assessed the relationships between school
characteristics and the different types of student movement, suggest that
demographic characteristics and student achievement are more strongly related to
movement to and from school districts than charter schools. Our findings suggest
that student mobility in school districts serving large percentages of minority
students is likely motivated by reactive mobility rather than active choice.
Conversely, special education services may be a pull factor that encourages
families to remain enrolled in school districts.
The cross-classification of schools by degree of mobility further
illuminates the patterns we identified in our regression analyses, and specifically,
the finding that in both sectors, mobility tends to be two-way rather than a pattern
that suggests competition (Authors, 2012). Some of the differences we observed
between the two sectors are likely attributable in part to location. High mobility
districts were predominantly small rural districts that ranged widely in size from
extremely small (serving fewer than 100 elementary school students) to above
average. Finally, the CBSA analysis highlights regional differences in patterns of
mobility and how education markets vary considerably within and across local
contexts. It also indicates that many districts with relatively high mobility rates
do not have a strong charter school presence, which again underscores how most
student movement in Arizona is between public school districts. Mapping district
mobility patterns in relation to charter school location also highlighted how it is
important to pay attention to the geospatial dimensions of school choice.
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Conclusion
While our study focuses on the educational marketplace in Arizona, a state
with a long history of supporting student choice options and policies, our findings
have relevance for policymakers and practitioners beyond the Arizona context.
First, our study indicates that the patterns we identified for metropolitan Phoenix
in our earlier study were also evident statewide and within other local markets
(Authors, 2012). Our simultaneous analysis of interdistrict and charter school
mobility suggests that Arizona’s open enrollment policy may have a greater effect
on student enrollment decisions and student mobility than simply the presence of
charter schools alone because the movement between districts is proportionately
larger than the movement to and from charter schools. It is likely that this pattern
is not unique to Arizona but will be evident in other states that have interdistrict
choice policies and charter schools operating simultaneously, a finding that has
relevance for policymakers in other contexts. In other states with multiple school
choice policies such as Michigan and Ohio, and in particular those with
mandatory open enrollment (Education Commission of the States, 2018), it is
likely that open enrollment will have a greater effect on student enrollment
decisions and student mobility than charter schools alone.
Second, patterns of mobility vary considerably across districts. Districts
with higher rates of in- and out-mobility may find it useful to work with
neighboring districts to mitigate the effects of these two-way patterns of student
mobility, which include the fiscal consequences of declining enrollments and the
challenges of educating students that move frequently between districts and
sectors. Third, the analysis also highlights how a substantial number of students
move from charter schools back into traditional public school settings, an
understudied phenomenon. This between-sector movement may be important for
researchers interested in understanding how school choice works in other settings
to address in their analyses (Author, 2017). We need to better understand the
characteristics of charter schools with high mobility rates as well as the
characteristics of students who leave charter schools to return to traditional public
schools and how these movements shape their educational careers. Fourth, our
findings reinforce the findings in previous studies of school choice programs and
charter schools that low-income and minority students are more likely to move in
and out of lower-performing charter schools and school districts. Finally, in this
study we are only able to address patterns of student movement but we do not
know the motivations of families that underlie these patterns. To fully understand
how families engage with school choice policies, researchers, policymakers, and
practitioners need to better document and analyze the reasons for student mobility
before we can conclude that these enrollment patterns reflect families’ active use
of market-based school choice policies.
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Appendix 1
Table A1
Descriptive Statistics by Sector for Regression Samples
School Districts
(N=161)
Mean (S.D.)
Students End 2007-08 (#)
2853 (4972)
Total Movers (#)
224 (324)
Students Beg. 2008-09 (#)
2845 (4941)
Total Incoming (#)
215
Percentage difference
-.21 (4.66)
Mobility Variables
Movers (%)
8.58 (4.63)
Movers to Local School Districts
55.72 (28.03)
Movers to Local Charter Schools
12.76 (13.38)
Incoming (%)
8.32 (3.97)
Incoming from Local School Districts
56.16 (28.51)
Incoming from Local Charter Schools
10.31 (10.23)
Demographic and Achievement Variables
End of 2007-08 (%)
White
44.09 (28.74)
Hispanic
41.23 (28.51)
African American
3.14 (3.78)
American Indian
10.08 (23.48)
Asian American
1.47 (1.79)
Movers
White
46.10 (28.96)
Hispanic
35.46 (27.08)
African American
4.27 (5.91)
American Indian
12.03 (24.50)
Asian American
1.51 (2.88)
IEP (%)
12.60 (4.24)
Mean NCE Mathematics
49.83 (7.23)

Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2019

Charter Schools
(N=198)
Mean (S.D.)
204 (250)
38 (59)
206 (249)
39 (68)
11.01 (111.43)
21.31 (11.01)
67.56 (20.33)
22.20 (17.29)
21.79 (15.28)
68.55 (22.53)
20.28 (17.83)

55.60 (28.21)
29.42 (25.92)
6.75 ( 7.53)
4.96 (14.62)
3.25 (3.85)
55.36 (28.18)
28.73 (25.70)
7.32 (9.77)
4.85 (13.85)
3.73 ( 7.31)
8.78 (5.37)
51.54 (11.21)
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